Vestnik of Northern (Arctic) Federal University.
Series "Humanitarian and Social Sciences"
ISSN 2227-6564 e-ISSN 2687-1505 DOI:10.37482/2687-1505
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Section: Philosophy, Sociology, Politology Download (pdf, 3MB )UDC165.62+141.13AuthorsDemin Ilya VyacheslavovichSamara State Aerospace University 34 Moskovskoe shosse, Samara, 443086, Russian Federation; e-mail: ilyadem83@yandex.ru AbstractThis article dwells on the relationship between primary and secondary historicity and draws parallels between Karsavin’s metaphysics of all-unity and Heidegger’s existential analytic. Primary historicity, which is understood as primordial relatedness of the subject with its past, in both concepts is regarded as the essential characteristics of subject being as such. In Karsavin’s metaphysics, subject is understood as a unity of its states (qualities). The all-unity subject does not exist in history, but history itself exists in it and is a structural moment of its existence. In Heidegger’s fundamental ontology, the existentially reconsidered subject – Dasein – is the only being which both has a history and is able to renew and update the meanings of its past in its (current) existence. The artefacts of material culture are not historical in the primary sense. They acquire historical characteristics through their correlation with human (subject) being. In Heidegger’s existential analytic, historical artefacts are considered as shards and signs of the old world (the world of Dasein come true). In Karsavin’s philosophy of history, artefacts of the past are viewed as a concretization and individualization of a particular state/qualities of the allunity subject. According to both conceptions, historical artefacts initially contain a reference to primary historical things and find their historical meaning only in relationship with them. The differences between Heidegger’s and Karsavin’s interpretations of history and historicity arise from different understandings of subject and subject being. Heidegger considers the historicity of Dasein to be an original and irreducible structure of being-in-the-world. Karsavin, in his turn, believes the historicity of the subject and its states to be a sign and manifestation of empirical all-unity.Keywordshistoricity, philosophy of history, all-unity, metaphysics of all-unity, Lev Karsavin, Martin HeideggerReferences
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