UDC

141:165.12

DOI

10.37482/2687-1505-V352

Authors

Galina I. Zavyalova

Cand. Sci. (Philos.), Assoc. Prof., Assoc. Prof. at the Department of Philosophy, Cultural Studies and Sociology, Orenburg State University (address: prosp. Pobedy 13, Orenburg, 460018, Russia).

e-mail: lanser35@mail.ru*, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-5015-1160

Vadim G. Nedorezov

Cand. Sci. (Philos.), Assoc. Prof., Assoc. Prof. at the Department of Philosophy, Cultural Studies and Sociology, Orenburg State University (address: prosp. Pobedy 13, Orenburg, 460018, Russia).

e-mail: nvad@yandex.ru, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9402-3515

Leonid Yu. Pisarchik

Cand. Sci. (Philos.), Assoc. Prof., Assoc. Prof. at the Department of Philosophy, Cultural Studies and Sociology, Orenburg State University (address: prosp. Pobedy 13, Orenburg, 460018, Russia).

e-mail: leonidtp@yandex.ru, ORCID: https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2169-5932

Abstract

This paper dwells on the understanding of intentionality by J. Searle, who developed the problem of intentionality as the core of the philosophy of mind. The research is relevant since the philosophy of mind occupies a prominent place in analytic philosophy, Searle’s concept of consciousness being central in this context. The purpose of the article is to describe Searle’s view on the problem of intentionality. He had to face the position that mental states (consciousness) do not exist, which was expressed by many representatives of analytic philosophy, including G. Ryle and D. Dennett. They relied on the ideas of behaviourism, with its stimulus-response formula, excluding consciousness as the mediator in this process. The paper demonstrates Searle’s arguments in defence of the existence of mental states. Moreover, Searle pointed out a criterion of the existence of consciousness, namely, intentionality. This criterion made it possible to draw a demarcation line between physical and mental states. Searle attempted to overcome the dualism of consciousness and physical processes, which was important since dualism was the subject of constant criticism from naturalists. The article uses the method of historical and philosophical analysis, comparative method and theoretical reconstruction. The novelty of the study lies in the fact that it demonstrates Searle’s significant contribution both to the problem of consciousness, by showing its specificity, and to the problem of intentionality.

Keywords

concept of consciousness, mental state, speech act, intentionality, artificial intelligence, J. Searle

References

1. Nikonenko S.V. Analiticheskaya filosofiya: osnovnye kontseptsii [Analytic Philosophy: Basic Concepts]. St. Petersburg, 2007. 546 p.
2. Nikonenko S.V. Intentsional’nost’: amerikanskaya tochka zreniya [Intentionality: An American Point of View]. HORIZON. Fenomenologicheskie issledovaniya, 2017, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 9–44. https://doi.org/10.21638/2226-5260-2017-6-1-9-44
3. Dubrovskiy D.I. Novoe otkrytie soznaniya? (Po povodu knigi Dzhona Serla “Otkryvaya soznanie zanovo”) [A Rediscovery of Consciousness? (On John Searle’s Book The Rediscovery of the Mind]. Voprosy filosofii, 2003, no. 7, pp. 92–111. Available at: https://old.virtualcoglab.ru/html/ddi_2.html (accessed: 4 January 2024).
4. Gryaznov A.F. Analiticheskaya filosofiya [Analytic Philosophy]. Moscow, 2006. 375 p.
5. Vasil’ev V.V. Trudnaya problema soznaniya [The Hard Problem of Consciousness]. Moscow, 2009. 269 p.
6. Yulina N.S. Golovolomki problemy soznaniya: kontseptsiya Deniela Denneta [The Enigmas of the Problem of Consciousness: Daniel Dennett’s Concept]. Moscow, 2004. 544 p.
7. Ladov V.A. Ponyatie “proizvodnaya intentsional’nost’” v sovremennoy amerikanskoy filosofii [The Concept “Derivate Intentionality” in Contemporary American Philosophy]. Vestnik Tomskogo gosudarstvennogo universiteta, 2007, no. 295, pp. 87–90. Available at: http://vital.lib.tsu.ru/vital/access/manager/Repository/vtls:000474468 (accessed: 11 February 2024).
8. Ryle G. The Concept of Mind. New York, 1950. 334 p. (Russ. ed.: Rayl G. Ponyatie soznaniya. Moscow, 1999. 408 p.).
9. Dennett D.C. Kinds of Minds: An Understanding of Consciousness. London, 1996. 184 p. (Russ. ed.: Dennet D.S. Vidy psikhiki: Na puti k ponimaniyu soznaniya. Moscow, 2004. 184 p.).
10. Belyanin M.N. Dzhon Serl i “trudnaya problema soznaniya” [John Searle and the “Hard Problem of Consciousness”]. Vestnik Moskovskogo universiteta. Ser. 7: Filosofiya, 2011, no. 4, pp. 38–50.
11. Chalmers D. The Conscious Mind: In Search of a Fundamental Theory. New York, 1996. 414 p. (Russ. ed.: Chalmers D. Soznayushchiy um. V poiskakh fundamental’noy teorii. Moscow, 2015. 512 p.).
12. Goncharova S.Yu. Intentsional’nost’ soznaniya kak biologicheskoe svoystvo mozga [Intentionality of Consciousness as a Biological Property of the Brain]. Psikhologiya i psikhotekhnika, 2014, no. 3, pp. 295–303. https://doi.org/10.7256/2070-8955.2014.3.10612
13. Husserl E. Idei k chistoy fenomenologii i fenomenologicheskoy filosofii. Kn. 1. Obshchee vvedenie v chistuyu fenomenologiyu [Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. Book 1. A General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology]. Moscow, 2009. 489 p.